

Large-Scale Allocation of Personalized Incentives

Partner Institution




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Conference paper


Javaudin, Lucas, et al. "Large-scale allocation of personalized incentives." 2022 IEEE International Intelligent Transportation Systems Conference (ITSC). IEEE, 2022.



$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Min. over all incentive allocations} \\ & \min_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \sum_i \sum_j \pi_{i,j}(y) \cdot b_{i,j} \\ & \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_i \sum_j \pi_{i,j}(y) \cdot y_{i,j} \leq Q \\ & \quad y_{i,j} \geq 0, \quad \forall i, j \\ & \quad \pi_{i,j}(y) \leq \pi_{i,j}^{\max} \end{aligned}$$


Sum over individuals
Sum over modes
Acceptance probability
Incentive for mode j of ind. i
Budget

Optimization problem of the regulator



	Mode choice after the policy				
	car	public transit	walking	cycling	motorcycle
car	55.839%	1.163%	0.099%	0.128%	0.097%
public transit	0.005%	27.29%	0.037%	0.032%	0.005%
walking	0%	0%	9.481%	0%	0%
cycling	0%	0%	0%	4.339%	0%
motorcycle	0%	0.005%	0.001%	0.001%	1.479%
total	55.843%	28.458%	9.618%	4.5%	1.581%

Evolution of modes shares before and after the policy (Scenario 3)



Definitions and Framework

Personalized-Incentive Policy

- **Topic:** **Mode choice** for the commute to work of many individuals
- Each mode of transportation is characterized by an **individual value** (or *utility*) and a level of **CO₂ emissions**
- A **regulator proposes incentives** to induce individual to switch to another transportation mode
- **Goal of the regulator:** **Minimize CO₂ emissions**, subject to the **budget constraint**
- **Assumptions:** Fixed congestion; independent CO₂ emissions

Solution under Perfect Information

Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problem and Greedy Algorithm

- **Perfect information:** The regulator knows exactly the individual values for each mode of each commuter
- The regulator optimization problem reduces to a **multiple-choice knapsack problem**
- A near-optimal incentive allocation can be found in polynomial time, using a **greedy algorithm** from Kellerer et al. (2004)
- **Properties:** Anytime algorithm, diminishing returns on budget spent

Solution under Imperfect Information

Choice Probabilities and a Novel Algorithm

- **Imperfect information:** The regulator knows the distribution of the individual values
- A **novel polynomial-time algorithm** can be used to find a near-optimal incentive allocation
- The algorithm uses **acceptance probabilities** (probability that the individual accepts the incentive)

Large-Scale Application

Mode Choice in Lyon Metropolitan Area

- Over **200 thousands individuals** and over **1 million alternatives**
- **5 modes of transportation:** car, public transit, walking, cycling and motorcycle
- **Four scenarios:**
 1. imperfect information with default unobserved,
 2. imperfect information with default observed,
 3. perfect information,
 4. proportional subsidy
- With a **daily budget of 25k euros**, CO₂ emissions can be reduced by **25 tons** (scenario 1), **50 tons** (scenario 2), **67 tons** (scenario 3) or **15 tons** (scenario 4)
- The **average incentive amount** is 3.99 euros in scenario 1, 1.56 euros in scenario 2 and 1.92 euros in scenario 3
- The **mode share of car** decreases from 57.3 % to 57.1 % (scenario 1), 52.6 % (scenario 2) or 51.8 % (scenario 3)